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  Abstract 
 
Digital innovation and data practices are increasingly central to the humanitarian 
response to recent refugee and migration crises. In this article I introduce the concept 
of technocolonialism to capture how the convergence of digital developments with 
humanitarian structures and market forces reinvigorates and reshapes colonial 
relationships of dependency. Technocolonialism shifts the attention to the constitutive 
role that data and digital innovation play in entrenching power asymmetries between 
refugees and aid agencies and ultimately inequalities in the global context. This 
occurs through a number of interconnected processes: by extracting value from 
refugee data and innovation practices for the benefit of various stakeholders; by 
materializing discrimination associated with colonialism; by contributing to the 
production of social orders that entrench the ‘coloniality of power’ and by justifying 
some of these practices under the context of ‘emergencies’. By reproducing the power 
asymmetries of humanitarianism, data and innovation practices become constitutive 
of humanitarian crises themselves. 
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Technocolonialism: digital innovation and data practices in the humanitarian 
response to refugee crises. 
 
In February 2019, the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) signed 
a $45 million USD partnership with Palantir Technologies, the US software firm 
known for its association with CIA and Cambridge Analytica and its work on 
predictive policing, advanced biometrics and immigration enforcement.1 The signing 
of this deal raised many concerns about whether Palantir will have access to the 
sensitive data or metadata of the 91.4 million people served by WFP each year. 
Questions were asked about the potential consequences for the privacy and rights of 
some of the world’s most vulnerable people. The opacity regarding the terms of the 
agreement, prompted 65 civil society organisations and individuals to write a letter to 
David Beasley, WFP’s executive director, asking for ‘concrete steps to mitigate the 
serious harm arising from the agreement’ and full transparency which is essential for 
meaningful accountability.2 The collaboration between the world’s largest agency 
fighting hunger and the Silicon Valley firm mainly known for its intelligence and 
military links rightly caused much alarm, but in reality the WFP-Palantir partnership 
is the tip of much larger phenomenon. There are thousands public-private 
partnerships in the humanitarian sector. 
A few months earlier, in March 2018 the Vatican held a hackathon bringing 
together over 120 engineers and scientists aiming to find solutions to social problems 
including migrant and refugee issues.3 The hackathon, entitled VHacks, took place 
over 36 hours in a 15th century palazzo in the Holy See and was co-sponsored by tech 
giants such as Google and Microsoft. The winning proposal from this particular event 
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was a mobile application (app) for refugees. Some commentators were amused by the 
seeming contradiction of bringing together cutting edge technology and the tradition 
represented by the Vatican (Valdez, 2018). But if anything, VHacks reveals the 
current pervasiveness of hackathons for social good. According to recent estimates 
there are over 1500 apps for migrants and refugees (Leurs & Smets, 2018) most of 
which are hardly used. Most of these apps are the outcomes of the hundreds of 
hackathons which have taken place since 2015 in response to the refugee crisis.  
These seemingly unconnected examples point to significant structural 
transformations taking place in the humanitarian field. Data and digital technologies 
have become central to humanitarian operations. Most UN agencies now have 
innovation labs and data departments. Refugee registrations by default involve 
biometric data which are outsourced to private vendors, part of the multimillion, 
rapidly expanding biometric industry. Large datasets are being used for needs 
assessment and the coordination of aid while artificial intelligence is being explored 
to track displaced people, predict population flows and future crises (UNOCHA 
2018). Datafication – the quantification of processes that were previously 
experienced qualitatively – and digitization are combined with increasing 
marketization, professionalization, pressure for humanitarian accountability and 
crucially, the dynamic entry of the private sector in the humanitarian field. The latter 
takes place largely through private-public partnerships, but also through the work of 
private entrepreneurs, global philanthropy and foundation work.  
This article develops a new theoretical concept, technocolonialism, in order to 
critically examine the role of digital innovation and data in humanitarian practice. 
Empirically, the paper focuses on the response to recent refugee crises such as the 
arrival of almost one million Rohingya people into Bangladesh (IOM, 2018)4 as part 
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of a larger study on the emergence of digital humanitarianism (Madianou, in 
preparation). The article draws on a mixed methods study involving interviews with 
seven groups of stakeholders, participant observation in the spaces of innovation as 
well as digital ethnography in order to critically unpack the role of digital innovation 
and data in the humanitarian response to recent refugee crises. The aim here is not to 
comprehensively report on the study, but rather to develop a theoretical concept 
through illustrative empirical examples.  
Rather than assuming that data and interactive technologies democratize 
humanitarianism by facilitating beneficiary participation, I conceptualize innovation 
and data practices as integral to the power relationships among the stakeholders in the 
humanitarian field. I argue that digital innovation and data practices reproduce the 
power asymmetries of humanitarianism and in so doing they become constitutive of 
humanitarian crises themselves. The recent dynamic entrance of private companies, 
and technology companies in particular, into the humanitarian field further 
accentuates the above tensions. The merging of humanitarian aid with business 
interests signals a further marketization of humanitarianism. The concept of 
technocolonialism aims to analyse the convergence of digital developments with 
humanitarian structures and market forces and the extent to which they reinvigorate 
and rework colonial relationships of dependency.  
The reworking of colonial relations of inequality occurs in a number of ways: 
through the extraction of value from the data of refugee and other vulnerable people; 
the extraction of value from experimentation with new technologies in fragile 
situations for the benefit of stakeholders, including private companies; by 
materializing the intangible forms and ‘ruins’ of colonial legacies such as 
discrimination; by contributing to the production of social orders that entrench the 
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‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano, 2000; Mignolo, 2018); and by justifying some of 
these practices under the shibboleth of ‘emergencies’. Before I discuss the 
contemporary transformations of the humanitarian field, the following paragraphs 
address why colonialism provides a useful framework and how data and innovation 
have become central in the humanitarian sector.  
 
Why colonialism? 
The choice of colonialism as part of the theoretical framework requires some 
explanation. Isn’t colonialism as ‘a practice of domination involving the subjugation 
of one people by another through military, economic and political means’ (Mignolo 
and Walsh, 2018: 116), superseded by the now well-established independence of 
postcolonial states? I argue, drawing on colonial (Stoler, 2016) and decolonial theory 
(Mignolo, 2011; Quijano, 2000), that colonial inequalities endure and metamorphose 
in the contemporary context. Quijano developed the notion of the coloniality of power 
to explain how the subjugation of the colonized outlived direct colonial rule and 
exploitation (2000). The dominance of eurocentric knowledge systems and the 
codification of racial and social discrimination interweaved with the pervasiveness of 
global capitalism perpetuate social domination and explain the endurance of 
coloniality after the emancipation of colonized territories from empire (Quijano, 
2000). For Mignolo (2011), coloniality is the ‘dark side of modernity’, the complex 
structure of management and control which underlies western civilisation (Mignolo 
and Walsh, 2018, p. 125).  
Some of these ideas intersect with Stoler’s seminal work on the durability of 
imperial formations in their tangible and intangible forms (2016). For Stoler, 
contemporary global inequalities are ‘refashioned and sometimes opaque reworkings 
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[…] of colonial histories’ (2016: 5). Empires leave behind debris – and these ruins are 
durable and can be reactivated and reworked under different conditions, often in 
oblique and opaque ways (Stoler, 2016). Crucially, Stoler (2016) observes that these 
connections are often ‘occluded’ – hidden – and thus mistakenly assumed to be new. 
The durable and hardened ‘ruins’ of colonial pasts produce ‘imperial formations’ 
(2016: 56) which are ‘processes of becoming and not fixed things’ and thus distinct 
from empire which represents a fixed and readily recognizable form of sovereignty 
(Stoler, 2008, p. 193-4). It is important to clarify here that the emphasis is not on a 
single, or dominant sovereign empire but rather on the intangible ‘protracted 
processes that saturate the subsoil of people’s lives and persist over a longue durée 
(Stoler, 2008, p.192). This is an invitation to reassess contemporary colonial relations.  
Several features of our globalized societies, from the acceleration of global 
capitalism to migration and displacement, can be traced to the colonial histories of 
which they have been part. Colonialism, with its emphasis on the extraction of 
resources from minerals to labour, underpins global capitalism.5 Extractivism, which 
today extends to the mining for data and other immaterial forms of labour (Mezzadra 
and Neilson, 2019), is at the heart of colonialism. This link between colonialism, 
extractivism and capitalism explains why my analysis draws on colonialism rather 
than the closely related notion of imperialism.  
Migration and displacement are often the historical products of the aftermath 
of European colonialism (Bhambra, 2017, p. 402; Hegde, 2016; Khiabany, 2016 
among others). For Stoler, migration and displacement are contemporary ‘imperial 
formations’. Recent migrations may not always follow established colonial routes, but 
are often the result of contemporary wars in which the US, the UK and other western 
countries have been engaged in, for example in Iraq and Afghanistan. Crucially, the 
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colonial order is reproduced through the racial subjugation of migrants, which is why 
De Genova argues that the European migration ‘crisis’ can only be understood 
through ‘the enduring coloniality of power’ (2016, p. 75).  
The tenacity of colonial inequalities can also be found in the continuities 
Stoler identifies between earlier formations such as 19th century penal colonies and 
contemporary refugee camps. Displaced people today have become ‘the toxic refuse 
of our contemporary world’ (Stoler, 2016, p. 337), taking the place of previous 
marginalized populations. Through the prism of colonial and decolonial theory, 
humanitarianism is understood as an imperial formation. Humanitarianism reproduces 
relationships of inequity between the western ‘saviours’ and the suffering former 
colonial subjects thus attesting to the enduring coloniality of power (Quijano 2000). 
While there have been critiques about humanitarianism as a type of neo-colonialism 
(Rieff, 2002) – a form of control of less developed nations through indirect means – 
the connection between colonialism and humanitarianism is generally occluded under 
the imperative to ‘do good’ and the context of emergencies.6 Paying attention to 
processes of occlusion reveals not only the legacies of colonialism, but also the active 
role that digital practices play in revealing or hiding relationships of inequality.  
There is a parallel discussion within the fields of internet and cultural studies 
about the role of big technology companies, inequalities and exploitation.7 Qiu (2016) 
has powerfully shown how the production of smartphones such as iPhones are based 
on the profound exploitation of Chinese workers at Foxconn factories. Colonial 
lineages can also manifested in technological obsolescence. The dumping of 
technology in poorer continents such as in Africa is literally an imperial debris, 
littering poor countries (Gabrys, 2011; Cubitt, 2017). Globalization may account for 
the dumping of technological refuse, but to understand why it’s dumped in Africa we 
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need an account of colonial durability. Further, technology giants are likened to 
empires. Programmes such as Facebook’s Free Basics – purporting to give free 
internet to poor people in developing nations – are colonial in their attitude to 
developing nations and exploitative. Free Basics claims to give ‘free’ internet to poor 
populations, when in fact it only gives access to a bare bones version of Facebook’s 
walled garden which includes a few handpicked apps. In return, Facebook can 
continue to grow by extending its reach and the company’s access to users’ data.8 The 
business model of contemporary social media is based on the provision of ‘free’ 
services in exchange of extracting personal data, which are sold to advertisers whilst 
furthering tech companies’ authority over the production of knowledge 
(Vaidhyanathan, 2018) and capacity to influence behaviour (Zuboff, 2019). Such 
phenomena are popularly referred to ‘digital colonialism’. More recently the term 
‘data colonialism’ (Thatcher, O’Sullivan & Mahmoudi, 2017; see also Couldry & 
Mejias, 2019) has received attention, emphasizing data as a form of capitalist 
expropriation although some of these arguments gloss over the structural asymmetries 
between the global north and south which are at the heart of the notion of 
technocolonialism.  
The following paragraphs consider the uses of data and innovation in the 
humanitarian field more specifically.  
 
The promise of technology: digital innovation and datafication 
With over 135 million people across the world needing humanitarian 
assistance in 2018, the sector faces significant challenges. One of the driving forces 
behind the focus on innovation and (big) data initiatives is the expectation that they 
can provide solutions to some of these complex challenges. As we’ll see in the next 
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section, innovation projects are also driven by the private sector. As a result 
‘innovation’ seems to be ubiquitous: major agencies have innovation labs, funding 
applications are often expected to include an innovation element whilst innovation 
was a designated main theme for the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit (Sandvik, 
2017). A close reading of the various systematic reports reveals that innovation is 
often synonymous with digital or data developments and underpinned by a 
progressivist and deterministic understanding of technology ‘that identifies, adjusts 
and diffuses ideas about improving humanitarian action’ (Obrecht and Warner, 2016). 
Innovation is linked to experimentation and risk-taking which is particularly 
problematic when applied to vulnerable populations such as refugees. I understand 
innovation as the result of a mutual shaping of social, political and technological 
processes which often preserve institutional orders (Suchman & Bishop, 2010). 
Innovation and data practices are closely linked as digital innovation projects produce 
data, while innovation is often aimed at improving the efficiency of data management, 
whilst itself often resulting from complex data modelling.  
Big data are large datasets which are computationally readable and 
manipulable. Data derive from a variety of sources including social and mobile 
media, sensors and satellite feeds. The abundance of such datasets has been key for 
the rise of practices by remote volunteers as well as humanitarians who aim to map 
disaster damage and assess the needs of people in emergencies (Meier, 2015). Big 
data are seen as representative of the voice of affected people despite significant 
critiques about the epistemological, ontological and ethical limitations of crisis data 
(Crawford & Finn, 2015). For example, big data during disasters often exclude data 
from those most affected by a crisis, therefore reproducing inequalities. The lack of 
representativeness and the presence of temporal and other bias render the use of big 
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data during emergencies potentially harmful (Crawford & Finn, 2015). Another 
important development here concerns the central role of private companies in the 
collection and ownership of large datasets – as opposed to states which traditionally 
were associated with data collection (see Taylor & Broeders, 2015 for parallel 
observations in the development context). This represents a significant shift as data 
ownership is associated with monitoring and surveillance powers while it also raises 
accountability and ethical issues. Apart from large datasets, smaller data such as those 
containing beneficiary data, are becoming central to the work of humanitarian 
agencies. Data management has become a key component of humanitarian operations 
which is why the articles focuses on data practices as opposed to data as an object. By 
shifting the emphasis from data to datafication I am able to explore the power 
relations associated with data practices. Combining colonial and decolonial theory 
with critical data studies, explains the structural conditions that enable datafication 
rather than focus on the limitations of data per se. 
 
The rapidly changing humanitarian sector: five logics 
The development of the term technocolonialism acknowledges that 
phenomena like displacement, migration, refugee camps, humanitarianism as well as 
the development of digital technology itself are steeped in colonial relations of 
inequality. Technocolonialism shifts the attention to the constitutive role that data and 
digital innovation play in entrenching inequalities between refugees and humanitarian 
agencies and, ultimately, inequalities in the global context. How does the digital 
rework and revitalize ‘imperial debris’ (Stoler, 2008)? Do digital interventions make 
tangible the previously intangible, do they reveal or further occlude histories of 
exploitation? I argue that digital technology and data practices materialize the 
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intangible forms and debris of colonial legacies. Furthermore, inequalities are 
entrenched by the extractive nature of technocolonialism. As the empirical analysis 
will reveal, beneficiaries produce value through data practices which is then extracted 
for the benefit of the various stakeholders. 
To understand the consequences of data and innovation for humanitarian 
practice I situate my analysis within a rapidly transforming field characterized by five 
competing logics. The intersection of traditional humanitarian actors and donors, 
private companies and digital volunteers gives rise to these logics. One factor driving 
digital developments is the need to address the longstanding power asymmetries 
within humanitarianism. The logic of humanitarian accountability assumes that 
interactive technologies will give voice to affected communities to hold aid agencies 
to account. The logic of humanitarian accountability is at odds with a second logic of 
audit, which recognizes the potential of technologies and data as metrics for audit 
which donors demand (Krause, 2014; Stein, 2008). The entry of business interests in 
the humanitarian space signals a logic of capitalism, while the popularity of collective 
problem-solving events such as hackathons indicates a logic of solutionism – the idea 
that technology can solve complex social problems. Finally, the logic of securitization 
focuses on rendering refugees as security threats and the uses of technology to protect 
state sovereignty. These are analytical distinctions; in practice, the logics intersect and 
engender new, hybrid discourses about technology and social change. But let’s first 
examine each logic separately before exploring their intersection in the second part of 
the article.	  
 
The logic of humanitarian accountability 
TECHNOCOLONIALISM       
	   12	  
The enthusiasm for digital innovation within humanitarianism can be partly 
understood as a response to the ongoing demand for humanitarian reform and 
accountability. Humanitarianism has been criticized for reproducing the asymmetrical 
power relationships on which it is based (Terry, 2002), for disrupting local solidarities 
and creating new dependencies (de Waal, 1997) leading some commentators to argue 
that humanitarianism is a form of neo-colonialism (Rieff, 2002). Digital platforms are 
seen as answers to the above problems: the interactive nature of platforms is assumed 
to give voice to displaced and marginalized people and to enable their participation 
with an aim to ultimately correct power asymmetries and strengthen accountability to 
affected people (Madianou et al, 2016).  
Developments in big data have further accentuated the optimistic discourse 
about a ‘new era of humanitarianism’ (Meier, 2015; UNOCHA, 2013). Datasets 
derived from social and mobile media are assumed to reveal the needs of disaster-
affected people thus contributing to the democratization of humanitarian response by 
correcting the power asymmetries on which it is based (Meier, 2015; UNOCHA, 
2013). According to recent reports the involvement of people in their own recovery – 
through their data – leads to enhanced accountability and a ‘rapid decentralization of 
power’ (World Disasters Report, 2013). Apart from data mined from social and 
mobile media, humanitarian organizations increasingly collect their own datasets 
often through dedicated software packages such as Kobo Toolbox. Accountability 
initiatives are typically interpreted as feedback mechanisms, which are increasingly 
digitized using messaging apps such as Whatsapp (ICRC et al, 2017), or dedicated 
platforms developed in-house. Large datasets underpin the development of Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) applications which are claimed to predict future emergencies and 
population flows. Even though the field of critical data studies has compellingly 
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demonstrated the ontological and epistemological limitations of big data (lack of 
representativeness and objectivity, temporal and spatial bias among others; see 
Crawford & Finn, 2015), such critiques haven’t dampened the enthusiasm for digital 
innovation for humanitarian reform and accountability. 
 
The logic of audit 
The second logic which drives the enthusiasm for interactive technologies in 
the humanitarian field is at odds with the logic accountability and reform. If the first 
logic involved the criticism, the deficiencies of humanitarianism, the second logic 
derives from its phenomenal success. The field has grown hugely over the last two 
decades with the global aid relief economy estimated at 156 USD billion (IRIN, 
2015). This significant growth is explained if we consider structural factors such as 
the withdrawal of nation states from service provision, which they outsource to 
agencies (Stein, 2008). Nation states remain involved as donors, which in turn 
demand evidence of impact such as metrics provided by digital technologies 
(Madianou et al, 2016). The increasing marketization of the field, whereby agencies 
compete for funding, explains the enthusiasm for digital technologies. The short cycle 
of funding exacerbates the reliance on metrics and ‘impact data’ as agencies need to 
constantly justify how many people they have reached. Digital technologies, metrics 
and data become the means through which agencies can secure funding and justify 
their presence in the field (Krause, 2014; Madianou, et al 2016). Populations in need – 
through their data – legitimate humanitarian projects and justify agencies’ funding 
applications to national governments and other donors. Further, data and innovation 
are seen as opportunities to enhance the efficiency and transparency of humanitarian 
operations as is evident in the use of biometric registrations which were introduced by 
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the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to combat low-level 
fraud (UNHCR, 2002). The use of data and innovation in this context is driven by the 
logics of audit and efficiency – rather than accountability. The logic of audit reveals 
an instrumental relationship between agencies and beneficiaries which instead of 
reversing power inequalities serves to sustain them (Madianou et al, 2016). Such 
processes are not unique to humanitarianism which has been affected by 
neoliberalism and an explosion of a culture of audit just like most sectors of public 
life (Strathern, 2000).	  
 
The logic of capitalism   
The WFP-Palantir partnership is one of thousands of public-private 
partnerships in the humanitarian space since 2010. Almost all major tech companies 
have developed partnerships with UN and other agencies: Accenture, Amazon, 
Facebook, Google, IBM, Microsoft to name a few. Corporate giants such as 
Mastercard have collaborated with some of the largest humanitarian or 
intergovernmental agencies in order to improve the efficiency of cash transfers and 
aid distributions. Many of these platforms rely on the use of biometric data such as 
eye irises, which are used for the identification of beneficiaries. A number of issues 
arise from such private – public partnerships: who owns the sensitive personal data? If 
the software used to collect and process data is privately owned, does the corporation 
own the data? If the hardware and technological infrastructure used to collect 
biometric data is designed and owned by a private corporation, does that company 
have access to the data? It is worth noting that such data are so rich and detailed that 
some years ago not even governments would dream of having access to. These 
concerns became particularly acute when mobile operators shared their users’ data 
TECHNOCOLONIALISM       
	   15	  
with non-profits like Flowminder and other NGOs during the Nepal earthquake and 
the Ebola epidemic leading Sean McDonald to speak about ‘Big Data Disasters’ 
(McDonald, 2016). The ontological and epistemological limitations of crisis data 
(Crawford & Finn, 2015) are compounded by the fragility of political and legal 
systems where aid takes place.  
For private companies the involvement in humanitarian projects represents 
excellent branding and PR opportunities with further potential benefits, such as 
increased visibility, access to new markets, access to data and opportunities to pilot 
new technologies. A well-known critique of corporate social responsibility is that by 
cloaking the market in a moral discourse it offers companies a veil for profit-making. 
However, my fieldwork reveals that the motive for profit isn’t necessarily concealed. 
During industry events such as GSMA’s Mobile World Congress, 
telecommunications representatives openly discuss the business opportunities 
presented through technology for social good initiatives. The opportunity for profit 
making is also acknowledged in press headlines such as the following from the 
Financial Times: ‘Refugee camps are an untapped opportunity for the private sector’.9  
Providing a veil for profit-making isn’t the most interesting dimension of the 
logic of capitalism. What matters more is the way in which private companies can 
extend their authority over the social order. Foundation work and CSR create 
opportunities for companies to pursue their political and social objectives. As Rajak 
observes, by turning themselves into agencies for development and humanitarianism, 
corporations are able to reframe political problems in line with their own business 
objectives (Rajak, 2011, p. 13). To render displacement, which is a political problem, 
as an issue with a ‘mobile connectivity’ or ‘technological’ solution is to depoliticize 
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displacement whilst advancing a business agenda. It is in this sense that corporations 
extend their power over the social order.  
 
The logic of solutionism 
Solutionism, the desire to find technological solutions for complex social 
problems, is evident in several initiatives including the work of ‘digital 
humanitarians’, the thousands of volunteers who offer their skills and expertise 
through hackathons, or in the crowdsourcing of disaster mapping exercises (Meier, 
2015). While the incredible amount of volunteer labour is very impressive (Dittus, 
2017), a closer look suggests that several of these events are too focused on 
innovation, rather than the understanding of the actual humanitarian problems. 
Hackathons, which started as corporate events, have become popular in the 
development and humanitarian sectors (Irani, 2015) and have been widely used in the 
response to the so-called European migration crisis.  
The prioritization of technology is evident when looking at hackathons’ 
winning criteria. The Vatican Hackathon which opened this article, employed 10 
criteria under four broad categories, namely: impact (the identification of the problem, 
proposed solution and impact it will have); viability (the underlying business model 
and plans for future growth); technology (level of innovation, the complexity and 
quality of code) and finally presentation.10 Techfugees, a non-profit dedicated to 
finding solutions to refugee issues, employs the following criteria in its hackathons: 
the relevance to the needs of refugees; financial culture, legal and operational 
feasibility; impact; the degree of disruption and /or innovation; and finally, scale-up 
potential.11 Only one out of the 10 VHacks criteria – and one out of five in the case of 
Techfugees – is about the actual problem of displacement suggesting that the solution 
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and its and its commercial viability are heavily prioritized. The emphasis on the ‘level 
of innovation and disruption’ speaks volumes about how the shiny cart of technology 
is put before actual social and political problems. It is striking that ‘disruption’ is one 
of the success criteria: how can the Silicon Valley mantra ‘move fast and break 
things’ be applied to politically sensitive and potentially fragile situations? Yet the 
mantra of disruption is evoked time and again. Josephine Goube, CEO of Techfugees, 
stated in her opening plenary to the SXSW industry conference in Austin, Texas: ‘If 
tech disrupts people’s lives, we are going to disrupt the lives of the people (refugees) 
who are in the most need of disruption.’12 This quote echoes mainstream views on 
innovation from within the humanitarian sector:  
‘The exploratory and uncertain nature of innovation, means that some degree 
of failure is inherent […] Organisations and donors will need to become less 
risk averse and embrace failing fast in order to support improvement’ 
(Obrecht, 2016, emphasis added).  
 
The notion of disruption and ‘failing fast’ is particularly troubling when one 
considers the fragile envirnonments where innovation takes place. ‘Failing fast’ in a 
refugee camp can have devastating consequences for displaced people and is at odds 
with the core humanitarian principle: ‘Do no harm’. Coupled with the logic of 
capitalism, the logic of solutionism can extend to the normalisation of technological 
pilots, or experiments among vulnerable populations in order to test new technologies 
and create hype around certain innovations (Jacobsen, 2015; Madianou, 2019).  
The notion of disruption is particularly troubling when combined with a lack 
of engagement with the socio-political context concerning displacement. Goube’s talk 
at SXSW started with a disclaimer about how she did not intend to talk about politics 
or advocacy, but rather only focus about how technology can help. This decoupling of 
understanding and action exemplifies Chouliaraki’s notion of post-humanitarianism 
which refers to solidarity without the moral and emotional weight which accompanies 
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the deep engagement with distant suffering (Chouliaraki, 2013). The self-referential 
dimension of post-humanitarian action becomes evident in recent critiques of 
hackathons as the spaces for the production of entrepreneurial subjects (Irani, 2015) 
and as ‘a great way to build networks, strengthen communities and reinforce beliefs in 
common goals’ rather than actually help displaced people (Geber, 2016). Hackathons 
exemplify the post-humanitarian disposition of ‘feeling good’ about oneself.  
 
The logic of securitization  
The fifth logic centers on the role of the state. The logic of securitization 
complements the other ways in which states become involved in humanitarian 
operations (for example, as donors). Securitization is particularly relevant in the 
response to migrant and refugee flows. Migration in the post 9/11 context has been 
interpreted as a security problem (Bigo, 2002) as was particularly evident in the 
response to the so-called European refugee crisis of 2015, which was largely driven 
by the aim to secure borders. The logic of securitization reduces refugees to a security 
threat (Anderson 2014, p. 68) which is driven by ideological agendas that confirm the 
monopoly of the state as the provider of security whilst concealing ‘some of its own 
failures’ (Bigo, 2002, p. 65).  
The securitization of migration has been heightened by the proliferation of 
technologies of surveillance and control (Bigo, 2002). Securitization would have been 
impossible without digital systems of surveillance and data infrastructures. Also key 
is the expansion of the security industry, with the biometrics sector, which has grown 
enormously since 9/11, a case in point. States increasingly use biometrics as a way of 
controlling borders and keeping out the ‘undesirable’ populations (Agier, 2010). It is 
widely acknowledged that host governments often have data sharing agreements with 
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intergovernmental agencies such as UNHCR which always operate under state 
jurisdiction (Jacobsen 2015). UNHCR often conducts biometric registrations together 
with national governments. The sharing of sensitive data raises concerns about 
‘function creep’, which refers to the way that data collected for one purpose (e.g., 
refugee registration) may end up being used for an entirely different purpose (e.g., 
state surveillance) (Ajana, 2013b).  
 
The empirical study 
Before I illustrate how these logics intersect in current innovation and data 
practices, some context about the empirical study is necessary. The article is part of 
ongoing research, one of the first studies to bring together seven groups of 
stakeholders in order to understand the role of data and innovation in the humanitarian 
sector. The multi-method study includes: i) 37 semi-structured interviews with seven 
groups of stakeholders (donors, humanitarian organizations, government 
representatives private entrepreneurs and business representatives, digital developers, 
volunteers and affected people themselves); ii) participant observation in the spaces of 
innovation (such as hackathons and innovation labs); and finally, iii) digital 
ethnography.  
Fieldwork took place between July 2016 and May 2019 and interviews took 
place primarily in London, New York, Athens and Washington DC. Several 
participants in overseas missions were interviewed via videocalling platforms. 
Interviews lasted 60-90 minutes on average and were recorded, transcribed, 
anonymized and analyzed thematically. Digital ethnography (Pink et al, 2016) 
enabled me to immerse myself in the online spaces where humanitarian data and 
innovation are debated and reported. The article draws on secondary sources such as 
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blogs and dedicated websites, videos, podcasts, social media content and other 
archival material, which provided important contextual information. Given the global 
reach of the object of study, having access to various developments remotely has been 
vital for following what is a rapidly changing field.  
   
Intersecting logics and the reworking of colonial inequalities  
I will now move on to illustrate how these five logics intersect in current 
innovation and data practices while revitalising and reworking the asymmetries of 
colonial relations. The distinction between the different logics is analytical. In 
practice the five logics intersect creating a dynamic, which I theorize as 
technocolonialism. Technocolonialism operates along a continuum. Not all 
innovations are problematic, while some are more problematic than others. The aim 
here is not to present an exhaustive review of all technological and data interventions 
in the humanitarian response to refugee flows. Rather my objective is to develop a 
theoretical concept, supported by illustrative examples, which will help explain 
current practices in the humanitarian field.  
 
Technocolonialism as extraction 
The first example which brings together several of the above logics concerns a 
recent trend among traditional humanitarian agencies to develop apps to facilitate 
their accountability to and communication with displaced people. Feedback 
mechanisms have become synonymous with ‘accountability to affected people’ 
(Madianou et al, 2016). Feedback mechanisms are increasingly digitized using 
platforms which aggregate comments into large datasets. Until recently it was 
common for agencies to invite feedback via SMS (Madianou et al, 2016) while 
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commercial messaging apps (such as Whatsapp) have also been used (ICRC et al, 
2017). Some agencies have developed their own bespoke apps for feedback capture.  
The example discussed here concerns such an innovation produced by a major 
intergovernmental agency and illustrates how innovation and data are interlinked: in 
this particular case the product of innovation is meant to quantify and manage 
beneficiary data. 
At first level, like most feedback mechanisms the app follows the logic of 
accountability which aims to address the power asymmetries of humanitarian 
operations by giving voice to affected people. The app, which has been used in Cox 
Bazaar in Bangladesh as part of the Rohingya response, aims to capture the feedback 
of refugees in relation to the aid they receive. The app which can be installed on a 
smartphone invites refugee to submit their comments or short video; this feedback is 
subsequently uploaded via the app onto a secure server. While the app seems to 
follow the logic of accountability, a closer look suggests that there are other 
objectives at play. The website for the app lists three clear objectives:  
- Track outputs more effectively by mapping information gathered via SMS, 
surveys and other communication channels.  
- Monitor the progress of a project using an easily accessible online database 
and maps  
- Share project outcomes visually with colleagues, government partners, donors 
and other stakeholders.  
Even though accountability to refugees is seemingly the core objective, 
refugees are conspicuously absent from the listed objectives. The above list suggests 
that that feedback is directed to donors who demand evidence of ‘impact’. Further, 
feedback data streamline the management of ‘the project’, that is the distribution of 
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aid to refugees, revealing an emphasis on efficiency. Datafication increasingly serves 
the logic of efficiency and audit rather than the imperative of humanitarian reform and 
participation. While audit took place through earlier analogue mechanisms such as the 
logframe or surveys, the replicability of digital data systems accentuate the emphasis 
on audit (Madianou, et al, 2016). In this example we can see how data have become a 
new currency: the datafication of humanitarianism reveals that the flow of aid is not 
just directed from donors and agencies to ‘beneficiaries’. Beneficiaries, through their 
data, legitimate the work of agencies and donors. This wouldn’t necessarily be a 
problem if the feedback provided by refugees was acted upon. However, recent 
research has revealed a sharp disconnect between feedback collection and acting on 
beneficiary concerns (Madianou et al 2016). This disconnect is confirmed by some of 
my interviewees from within the aid community:  
‘These are not real feedback mechanisms. They are built to suck from 
communities. I call them “sucking apps”. But if it was real feedback, it should 
give back to the communities. That’s why it’s called feedback and not feed-in 
or feed-from’.  
 
The interviews reveal that there are several motivations for feedback 
innovation, often involving a range of audiences apart from the intended recipients 
(ie, the refugees). The marketization of humanitarianism and the intense competition 
for funding explains the prevalence of the logic of audit. The following quote from 
one of my participants suggests that competition between agencies is as, if not more, 
important than the logic of accountability, in the inception and design of digital 
platforms.  
‘Part of our motivation was the desire to improve our visibility – to show to 
other organizations what [our agency] does’. 
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Competition does not only take place among agencies, but also within large 
organizations, where different divisions compete for visibility and funding from the 
centre. Speaking about another app one of my participants remarked:  
‘Our main purpose through these projects, I’m not going to lie, was to prove a 
point  [within the organization] or to skill up globally, nationally or 
regionally’. [The app] was an example of proving a point’. 
 
Agencies are also in competition with the private sector and especially 
technology companies. An officer involved in the development another feedback app 
said:  
‘We wanted to gamify our relationship with migrants. We need to be the 
disrupters, not the disrupted’.  
 
In this revealing quote, gamification, typically associated with persuasive computing 
and behaviour modification experiments, is used to refer to the introduction of game 
elements into non-game situations. Here the assumption is that refugees will find the 
interaction with the app more fun and will be more likely to engage with it and 
therefore provide their data. Revealingly, gamification has been described as 
exploitationware (Bogost, 2013). The beneficiary here is not the refugee, but the app 
distributor. Turning feedback into a fun game may produce more refugee data, which 
in turn can provide stronger evidence for further funding. To paraphrase Monika 
Krause (2014), refugees are not the end, but a means to an end – the end being the 
continuation of funding in a competitive, marketized environment. Refugees produce 
value through their data which is then extracted to justify the funding of aid projects. 
Digital practices and datafication amplify the logic of audit and attendant 
marketization.  
The above quote also reveals the anxiety not to be left behind by other 
‘disruptors’ such as private tech companies. The logic of solutionism exemplified in 
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the mantra of disruption and ‘failing fast’ has been naturalized to the extent that it is 
taken for granted. The discourse of disruption is very problematic when applied to 
potentially fragile environments such as displaced populations. And yet, the discourse 
of innovation for social good is increasingly dominated by a desire to treat the camp 
as a laboratory for innovation as is evident in the following quote taken from a public 
talk by a senior officer from WFP’s Innovation Accelerator.13  
‘After the bootcamp the best start-ups can get funding from us from 50,000-
100,000 USD to pilot the idea in a developing world context. Our role is to do 
the matching… we will connect you to one of our offices around the world 
and part of the funding will be to go and test it on the ground in that field 
capacity. … We will continue to give you mentoring and help you think of 
your business model as you go forward’.  
 
Using the refugee camp as a testing ground for innovation is yet another 
example of the extractive nature of techocolonialism. The risks of experimentation are 
outsourced to some of the most fragile environments in the world with value extracted 
for the benefit of stakeholders including private entrepreneurs and large companies.  
There are many critical voices from within the humanitarian field which 
challenge some of these discourses and practices. As one of my participants stated: 
‘we do things that might get us a Nobel price in Africa – but which would get us 
arrested in Europe. Affected people are treated as guinea pigs’. This observation 
about the exploitative nature of innovation, experimentation and data practices echoes 
Sean McDonald’s argument about big data disasters.  McDonald (2016) drew on the 
sharing of users’ personal data by mobile networks during the Ebola crisis in order to 
highlight the asymmetries between the African and European contexts in relation to 
data and privacy safeguards. Similar concerns have surfaced recently regarding the 
biometric registration of the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.  
 
Materializing inequalities: biometric refugee registrations 
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 Biometrics, the technology for measuring physiological characteristics such as 
the iris and fingerprints, has become the default method for registering refugee 
populations with UNHCR aiming to have all refugee biometric data in one single 
population registry called PRIMES by the end of 2019 (UNHCR, 2019). More 
recently, biometrics were widely used in the 2017/8 Rohingya refugee crisis. As is 
typical with biometric enrolments, the Rohingya registration involved the state (in this 
case the Bangladeshi government), UNHCR and the private sector. The Rohingya 
registration was outsourced to a private contractor, which captured biometric data 
together with personal information and combined both on an identity card. We can 
discern the logics of securitization, audit, accountability and capitalism behind the 
adoption of biometric registrations. Biometrics are claimed to keep borders secure by 
screening undesirable bodies. UN agencies initially adopted biometrics to tackle low-
level fraud (Jacobsen, 2015), but increasingly justify biometrics as a way to improve 
the delivery of aid (Madianou, 2019). Finally, the direct involvement of the profitable 
biometric industry reveals the strong presence of the logic of capitalism.  
While biometrics is assumed to be an objective identification method, there is 
ample evidence that it codifies discrimination. Biometric technologies ‘privilege 
whiteness’ (Browne, 2015, p.110) with a significantly higher margin of error when 
measuring, or identifying ‘other bodies’. Biometrics systematically discriminates in 
terms of race, ethnicity, gender, class, disability and age (Magnet, 2011). At a more 
symbolic level, the association between biometrics, which have been traditionally 
used to control ‘deviant’ populations, and criminality contributes to the conflation 
between refugees with notions of illegality (Ajana, 2013a, p. 584). Power 
asymmetries are salient in the process of biometric registrations: refugee bodies are 
always being measured while humanitarian officers always ask the questions. 
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Demanding that refugees reveal their true identities through their biometric data 
attests to the enduring coloniality of power (Quijano, 2000). Transparency, a 
eurocentric and thus colonial concept, is always about control (Han, 2012).  
In the Rohingya case, the bias and power asymmetry inherent in all refugee 
biometric registrations was compounded by additional practices, which further 
materialized discrimination and risks for this specific population. The registration 
system did not offer the option ‘Rohingya’ as a possible ethnic identity. This is 
striking given this is a system to register the Rohingya and constitutes clear evidence 
that biometric datasets are not objective, but based on political decisions whilst 
claiming to be scientifically robust. The option offered to refugees, ‘Myanmar 
nationals’, is a term that Myanmar doesn’t recognize. This symbolic erasure of the 
Rohingya mirrors the much criticised, discriminatory 2014 census by Myanmar 
authorities, which didn’t offer people the option Rohingya, but instead labelled them 
‘Bengali’ nationals (Rahman, 2017).  
The power asymmetries involved in biometric registrations are further 
exacerbated by the fundamental lack of meaningful consent during refugee 
registrations when refusing to register amounts to refusal to receive assistance – 
something refugees can hardly afford.14 The well-documented lack of safeguards in 
countries without established legal frameworks regarding privacy and data protection 
raise concerns about the consequences if sensitive personal data are leaked, hacked or 
even shared – as happened during Ebola when the emergency of the epidemic 
overrode the established norms for data safeguards. A data breach can be devastating 
for a vulnerable population. For the Rohingya, it could potentially deny them job 
opportunities, or healthcare. The fact that the registration is outsourced to a private 
firm does not offer firm safeguards regarding data protection. 
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Further risks stem from potential ‘function creep’, the widening use of 
biometrics beyond the original purpose of registration, associated with the logic of 
securitization. There are concerns that the population registry may be shared with 
Myanmar and can be used to facilitate the repatriation of the Rohingya (Rahman, 
2017) as confirmed by the Bangladeshi Industry Minister:  ‘The reason behind the 
biometric process is to keep record of the Rohingya. We want them to go back to their 
own place.’15 Biometric data are the ultimate instruments of control – straight out of 
the colonial toolbox. Just like the 19th century penal colonies whose inhabitants were 
simultaneously abandoned and closely monitored (Stoler, 2016), refugees are 
similarly left isolated in what are widely accepted poor conditions and at the same 
time subject to constant counting and surveillance. To paraphrase Tom Streeter 
(2011), in the digital, colonialism finds the perfect tool.  
Function creep can also result from the logic of capitalism. Examples from the 
implementation of digital identity projects in the global south feed anxieties about the 
extraction of biometric data for profit as ‘vulnerable bodies are spun into gold’ 
(Magnet 2011, p. 153). For example, the Chinese AI company Cloudwalk, which has 
been commissioned to conduct biometric registrations of all Zimbabwean citizens as 
part of the national digital identity programme, openly admits extracting and reusing 
the data in order to improve its facial recognition algorithms which are sold 
worldwide.16 Even though the Cloudwalk example doesn't involve humanitarian 
organisations, it is a stark reminder of the lack of safeguards in contexts without legal 
frameworks around data protection. It is impossible not to be struck by the asymmetry 
here: such practices could not take place among European or North American 
citizens. 
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Refugees are not passive victims of such policies. In November 2018 groups 
of Rohingya based in Cox Bazaar went on strike protesting about the biometric 
identity cards, which they feared could pave their involuntary return to Myanmar 
risking further ethnic violence.17 The strikers expressed concerns about the potential 
data sharing with Myanmar, the fact that identity cards erased their ethnicity and that 
they hadn’t been consulted about the scheme. The strike culminated a period of 
intermittent protests throughout 2018, but was met with violence by the Bangladeshi 
authorities which were facilitating the registration process.18 Refugee registrations 
and the identity programme continued as normal. According to one of my 
interviewees who worked in the Rohingya response, efforts to communicate with 
affected communities ‘came after key decisions had been taken’. As in earlier 
humanitarian responses, feedback mechanisms focus on the evaluation of specific 
interventions rather than the issues that matter to affected people themselves 
(Madianou et al, 2016). The power asymmetries of humanitarianism, starkly evident 
in refugee camps, are too steep to overcome despite acts of resistance and 
contestation.   
Just like crisis data (Crawford & Finn, 2015), biometric data are ontologically 
and epistemologically limited. Because of their limitations, biometric data can have 
disastrous consequences for humanitarian subjects. Yet, biometric data are extremely 
successful for controlling and monitoring people. So biometrics can have devastating 
consequences both when they fail and when they succeed. By reproducing the 
asymmetries of humanitarianism data become constitutive of the crisis. The flawed 
data practices of the biometric registrations may determine outcomes for Rohingya 
people whether they remain in Bangladesh or if they are repatriated to Myanmar. In 
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the Rohingya case, data practices have indelibly inscribed, and therefore materialized, 
relationships of inequality.  
 
Conclusion 
I have proposed the notion of technocolonialism to capture the convergence 
between digital developments with humanitarian structures and market forces and the 
extent to which they reinvigorate and rework colonial relationships of dependency. 
Technocolonialism shifts the attention to the constitutive role that data and digital 
innovation practices play in entrenching inequalities between refugees and 
humanitarian agencies and, ultimately, inequalities in the global context. To 
understand the consequences of data and innovation for humanitarian practice I 
situate my analysis within a rapidly transforming field characterized by five 
competing logics: the logic of humanitarian accountability, the logic of audit, the 
logic of capitalism, the logic of solutionism and the logic of securitization. The 
distinction between the different logics is largely analytical. In practice the five logics 
intersect and in so doing they reactivate and rework the ‘colonial debris’ (Stoler, 
2013). Digital innovation and data practices materialize the often intangible ‘imperial 
formations’ (Stoler, 2016) and give them new life and vigour. My analysis also 
revealed that technocolonialism is extractive: refugees produce value through their 
data and participation in humanitarian experiments, which is then used for the benefit 
of stakeholders, including private companies. The paper explored two examples 
where innovation and data practices rework and revitalize the relationships of 
inequality and exploitation between refugees and humanitarian agencies.  
In the first example we observed that in the case of feedback apps digital 
innovation and data practices amplify the logic of humanitarian audit and 
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marketization. Although feedback apps appear to be addressing the demands for 
humanitarian reform and greater accountability, in practice they serve the logic of 
audit by streamlining the process of reporting to donors through the provision of 
easily retrievable and reproducible metrics about the evidence of impact which is a 
vital component for all funding applications, including the renewal of funding. 
Following the data trails in the humanitarian field reveals that datafication is 
constitutive in shifting accountability from affected people to donors. The logics of 
capitalism and solutionism further compound these asymmetries through the 
normalization of the Silicon Valley mantras of disruption and ‘failing fast’ in what are 
fragile political and social environments. The analysis revealed how refugees, through 
their data practices and participation in humanitarian experiments produce value 
which is extracted for the benefit of other stakeholders. Feedback datasets are used to 
justify the funding of aid projects; refugee camps are used as testing grounds for 
innovation and the scaling up of business models. Private companies extend their 
reach whilst appearing to provide market solutions for political problems.  
The second example focused on the risks associated with the biometric 
registration of Rohingya refugees. Here we observed the different logics intersect 
resulting in a potentially dangerous situation for the refugees. The already significant 
and well-documented risks and biases of biometric data (racial and gender bias, 
codification of discrimination, lack of data safeguards, function creep and ethical 
concerns given the lack of meaningful consent) were compounded by practices 
specific to this registration: the symbolic erasure of the Rohingya as an ethnic group 
from the official database. These concerns confirm that biometrics can become 
instruments of control and surveillance, ready to facilitate a possible repatriation of 
the Rohingya to Myanmar despite the risk of renewed ethnic violence. Despite 
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moments of hope, evident in the Rohingya strike which exemplified refugee agency, 
the structural power asymmetries are too steep to overcome. Digital technology and 
data ossify discrimination by turning soft data into a permanent, scientific record that 
is hard to contest. By reproducing the asymmetries of humanitarianism, data become 
constitutive of the Rohingya crisis. In this example, datafication and biometric 
experimentation reproduce the coloniality of power, whilst occluding discrimination 
under the discourse of science. 	  
While technology and data practices rework and revitalize imperial debris 
(Stoler, 2008), my argument is not solely a technological one. Neither technology, nor 
neoliberalism can explain the geopolitical significance of humanitarian interventions. 
The fact that technocolonial interventions take place in refugee camps or among 
displaced people can be explained if we understand the tenacity of imperial 
formations and the often occluded legacies of colonial domination. At the same time, 
technology and data practices play an equally significant role in sustaining the 
inequalities of the humanitarian system. This occurs in the following ways: by 
extracting value from refugee data for the benefit of stakeholders; by extracting value 
from experimentation through innovation projects for the benefit of stakeholders, 
including private companies; by materializing the intangible forms and ‘ruins’ of 
colonial legacies such as discrimination; by contributing to the production of social 
orders that entrench the ‘coloniality of power’ (Quijano, 2000); and by occluding 
some of these practices under the context of ‘emergency’, or science. The term 
technocolonialism is necessary because it pays equal attention to colonial legacies, 
datafication and innovation as well as global capitalism and inequality. North/South 
inequalities are at the heart of the notion of technocolonialism. While some of the 
arguments developed here may have wider applicability, ultimately technocolonialism 
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highlights that refugees and other humanitarian subjects are disproportionately 
affected by the convergence of digital developments, capitalism and colonial legacies.   
Not only does technocolonialism acknowledge the persistence of ‘imperial 
formations’, but it shifts the emphasis on the active work of the digital in turning 
colonial inequalities into tangible forms. The ‘data’ claim to science and objectivity 
occludes some of these practices whilst further compounding the durability of 
colonial legacies, turning inequalities into hard facts which are increasingly difficult 
to challenge. By reproducing the power asymmetries of humanitarianism, data and 
innovation practices become constitutive of humanitarian crises themselves. 	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